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SOME PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.*
When Hugo Grotius published his great work on Interna-
tional Law he entitled it, "Concerning the Law of Peace and
War." That obvious division of this great subject continues
after the lapse of nearly three centuries.
"The law of war," says Professor Holland,"as is well known,
consists of two great chapters. dealing respectively with the
relations of one belligerent to the other and with the relations
of each belligerent to neutrals."1 He goes on to show that the
former has been discussed for at least six centuries, not to men-
tion classical antiquity. The latter is comparatively modern,
dating, as a separate subject, only from the eighteenth century,
"though it has already come far to surpass in complexity and
importance, the law of belligerency."
It is with some problems in this surpassing branch of the
law of war-"the relations of each belligerent to neutrals"-
that we wish to deal.
THE TREATMENT OF NEUTRAL BLOCKADE RUNNERS.
In discussing in print during the last year, the law of block-
ade, the writer said that while "the older writers approved of the
corporal punishment of the blockade runner" yet "This is now
wholly obsolete and a confiscation of the ship, and by the rule of
infection, of any cargo belonging to the ship owner, and of any
portion of the cargo belonging to an owner cognizant of the
blockade or who makes the master his agent, is the sole punish-
ment. "' 2
A very eminent and gifted English judge, whose name has
for two generations been especially and most honorably iden-
ified with public law-Sir Walter Phillimore-by letter, cour-
teously discussing the proposition, suggested to the writer that
the rule could hardly be considered as settled; that it must be
held at least in doubt. Sir Walter cited the practice of the
* A paper read before the Section of International Law, Department of
Jurisprudence, in the International Congress of Arts and Sciences at St. Louis,
U. S. A., September 22, 1904.
i. Studies in International Law, by T. E. Holland (Oxford i898), p. 113.
2. Yale Law journal,, April, T9O3.
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United States in the war with the Confederacy, and especially
the imprisonment of the late Sir William Allan, M. P., and his
published reminiscences of the same. Sir William. by birth a
Scotchman, lived for years in the United States, but returned
to his native country and was later captured by a United States
cruiser in Savannah Harbor while serving as chief engineer on
a vessel engaged in running the blockade. He was held in
prison for six weeks, until he bribed a sentry to take a letter to
Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, and was then
released on parole. 8
Unfortunately, I have been unable to find Sir William's pub-
lished reminiscences. Neither is the State Department, nor the
Navy Department able to refer me to the facts in the case, nor
has the incident been observed in a very extended examinaion
of the printed volumes containing the history of the Federal and
Confederate navies. However, Sir Walter quotes to me a letter
from Sir William, written just before the latter's death in
December last:
"The U. S. authorities did imprison men taken in blockade
running. Our vessel ("Diamond") was taken to Washington.
We were turned over from the naval to the military authorities
there, . . . marched to the Provost Marshal's quarters.
Answered our names there, then our commitments to the old
Capitol Prison were made out."
,There they were "quartered with prisoners and had hard
usage." -Eventually he was paroled out and given a written
"parole" describing him as a prisoner of state, which parole he
retained through life.
It must be freely admitted that owing to unfamiliarity
with international law, and to the suspension, as a war measure,
of the writ of habeas corpus, so that our courts could not inter-
vene, numbers of cases like the above seem to have occurred.
That the situation was complicated by the fact that it was a
matter of constant controversy, first, as to the neutrality of the
ships, often claimed to be Confederate ships, and only colorably
sailing under a neutral flag; secondly, as to the nationality of
the members, of the crew, who were largely British, speaking
the same language with the people of the United States, and
who had often, like Sir William, lived for years in the United
States. The rule excepting from imprisonment applies only to
neutrals upon a neutral ship, and not to belligerents, or subjects,
or to those operating a vessel of the belligerent government.
3. The Daily Chronicle, London, December 29, 1903.
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So the commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard wrote
Acting Rear Admiral Lee, March 31, 1863: "I have disposed
of the crews of the captured vessels--foreigners sent on shore,
and citizens of the United States confined." 4
March 24 th in the same year, Captain Boggs of the "Sacra-
mento," one of the blockading ships off Wilmington, wrote to
the Rear Admiral in command, asking instructions as to the
disposition of persons "taken out of vessels seized'as a prize for
violating the blockade. To send them north in the vessel would
require a much larger prize crew than the exigency of the fleet
will permit. They are generally a daring set of men, and the
compensation to them would be the strongest inducement to
attempt a recapture." 5  The rear-admiral instructed him, in
reply, to send those known, or for good cause suspected, to be
citizens of the United States, north to the commandant of the
navy yard to which the vessel conveying them might be bound.
"Those against whom no such proof or suspicion is entertained,
if they are not needed as witnesses in the adjudication, will be
released from the blockading vessel as soon as practicable." 6
Certain of the crew of the captured British blockade runner
"Adeline" were released on signing an engagement not to be
again employed in like proceedings. Secretary Wells instructed
the flag officer of the blockading squadron that the Secretary of
State held this not warranted by public law and that the crew
could not be held as prisoners of war and that they were
absolved from the obligation. 7
On July 25, 1863, President Lincoln instructed the Secretary
of the Navy as follows:
"You will not in any case detain the crew of a captured
neutral vessel or any other subject of a neutral power on board
such vessel, as prisoners of war or otherwise, except the small
number necessary as witnesses in the prize court."
"NOTE-The practice here forbidden is also charged to exist,
which, if true, is disapproved and must cease." The president
adds: "What I propose is in strict accordance with international
law, while if it do no other good., it will contribute to sustain a
considerable portion of the present British Ministry in their




4. Record U. S. and Confed. Navies, Series i, Vol. 8, p. 643.
5. Official Rec. U. S. and Confed. Navies, Series i, Vol. 8, p. 625.
6. Official Rec. U. S. and Confed. Navies, Series i, Vol. 8, p. 804.7. .' . . . . .. . . .. .. . "1 12, P. 462.
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The right as a reasonable precaution to place the captured
crew in irons lest they rise and overpower the prize crew was
maintained in an elaborate letter of Secretary Seward to Lord
Lyons in x86,.8
The crew of the "Emily St. Pierre," taken off Charleston,
did retake the ship, gagging and putting in irons the prize
officers and crew. 9
In January, 1864. the Department of State sent to the Secre-
tary of the Navy intercepted correspondence showing that ves-
sels operated by the Confederacy in blockade running were
under orders to conceal their nationality, and suggesting that it
would be proper to direct that henceforth British blockade
runners be detained in custody and not released as heretofore.
Secretary Wells ordered accordingly, and countermanded incon-
sistent orders, 10 but this was in turn revoked by the Secretary
of the Navy, May x6, 1864, and full instructions issued in accord
with the views of President Lincoln, before expressed," ex-
empting bona fide neutrals on neutral ships from treatment as
prisoners of war, and holding them "entitled to immediate
release. '112
The modern doctrine that neutral blockade runners on a
neutral ship are not subject to bodily punishment is not contra-
vened, it is submitted, by the ultimate practice of the United
States in its blockade of the Confederate coast, by all odds the
greatest blockade known to history. It is believed that it is
sustained by the text-writers generally. 's
In the second great blockade of the past eighty or ninety
years, that of the Cuban coast, the "Instructions of Blockading
Vessels and Cruisers" issued by the Secretary of the Navy of
the United States in 1898, and prepared by the State Depart-
ment, expressly declare: "g. The crews of blockade runners
are not enemies and should be treated not as prisoners of war,
but with every consideration."
The whole subject is most admirably reviewed by Calvo.
The older practice is shown and that of the United States in the
war with the Confederacy, and at the close he justly observes:
8. Official Rec. U. S. and Confed. Navies, Series i, Vol. 12, p. 407 et sey.
9. 4 " 4 
-4 44 ' " ' " 814.
10. 9, 285.
II. Id., p. 40S.
12. Id., Vol. xo, lp. 6o, 6i.
13. Gaulaudet on Inter. L. (condensed from Calvo) p. 298; T. J. Lawrence
Prin. Inter. L., p. 592; Walker's Inter. L., p. 525; Woolsey Inter. L. (1899), p.
351; Hall's Inter. L. (1904), p. 710; 3. Phillimore's Inter. L., p. 5o6; et seq.
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"The usage concerning the non-infliction of bodily punishment
on persons guilty of violation of blockade has become uniform
enough so that we can consider confiscation of the property
captured as now the sole punishment."' 4
The Consul. General of the United States at Yokohama, by
letter of July 27, 1904, kindly advises me that in the present
Russo-Japanese war the Japanese have treated neutrals cap-
tured in attempting to run the blockade at Port Arthur in the
same way, holding them as witnesses, it might be, but not as
prisoners of war. That is, however, not strictly a blockade.
The Legation of Japan at Washington, under date of August 13,
1904, advises me of like practice by Japan as to officers and
crews of neutral ships recently captured while carrying contra-
band which is comparable to breach of blockade, and such
persons have been treated in the same way by Russia.
The rule as quoted from Calvo, that great and authoritative
writer on public law, seems, it is submitted, .to meet with con-
tinued and universal acquiesence.
CONTRABAND OF WAR.
On the 14 th of February, 1904, Russia, by proclamation,
announced that in the war with Japan she would treat as con-
traband, combustibles of all kinds, such as coal, naphtha, alcohol
and other like materials. Also all materials for the installation
of telegraphs, of telephones or railroads. This proclamation,
together with an explanatory instruction of March 6th, also
declares contraband anything capable of serving as food or
forage for the Japanese army, and especially rice and fish and
its different products, beans and their oil. 1 5 By ordinance of
April 26th, cotton was added to the list. Under these declara-
tions and ordinances, Russian war ships have seized neutral
vessels bound for Japanese ports and claimed as prize of war
articles of the character listed. For instance, they have seized
and caused to be condemned a cargo of American flour on a
neutral ship not consigned to the Japanese government, or in
any way ear-marked for belligerent use except by its destina-
tion to a port of Japan.
The doctrine that articles which may serve alike the uses of
peace or war are not contraband unless intended for the mili-
tary uses of a belligerent, rests on two broad principles:
14. Calvo, Le Droit International. Tome 5 Sect. 2899.
x5. Revue G~n6rale de Droit International Public, Mai et Juin, Documents
p. x2, et seg.
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First. That neutrals under modern usage cannot be hindered
in their general right to trade in innocent articles of commerce
with belligerents except by an actual blockade, never by a
proclamation.
Secondly. International law forbids a belligerent to make
war upon the civil or noncombatant population of its opponent,
and, as Hall says: "Hence seizure of articles of commerce
becomes illegitimate so soon as it ceases to aim at enfeebling
the naval and military resources of the country and puts imme-
diate pressure upon the civil population."' 6
The claim of Russia has been at once controverted. The
Department of State of the United States in a communication
to the Ambassadors of the United States of June ioth, took the
ground that articles of double use (ancigpitis usus) are contraband
if they are destined for the military uses of a belligerent. It
points out that the principle of the Russian declaration "might
ultimately lead to a total inhibition of the sale by neutrals to
the people of belligerent states of all articles which could be
finally converted to military use," and adds that such principles
"would not appear to be in accord with the reasonable and
lawful rights of a neutral commerce." Queen Elizabeth would
not allow the Poles and Danes to furnish Spain with provis-
ions, alleging that by the rules of war "it is lawful to reduce an
army by famine." 1 7 But the present government of England
has expressed its accord with the views of Secretary Hay
by an official note of protest, dated August ist. against the
claim that food is absolutely contraband. 18 Lord Lansdowne,
in the Lords August ixth, said that the Russian declaration
"greatly amplified the definition of contraband, including much
England regarded as innocent. England would not consider
herself bound to recognize as valid the position of any prize
court which violated the recognized international law." And
Mr. Balfour, in the Commons on the same day, said as to the
doctrine that a belligerent could draw up a list of articles it
would regard as contraband and that prize courts must decide
accordingly: "If that doctrine were accepted without reserva-
tion, neutrals would be at a serious disadvantage." August 25 th,
in reply to the Shipping Deputation, Mr. Balfour said there
was no possibility of Great Britain receding, inasmuch as she
16. Hall's Inter. L. (5th ed. 19o4) p. 656.
17. Taylor's Inter. L. p. 736; Grotius, Droit des Gens, in, see. 112, 117
and note to sec. 112.
IS. Boston Evtening Transcri t, Aug. 9, x9o4.
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knew she stood "on the basis of all recognized international law
to be found in all the text-books, and in accordance with the
general practice of civilized nations."
The English view, and it is believed it is the view of the
world, is well put by the Law Times of London. 1 9 It declares
"the position of Russia as to contraband cannot be accepted for
a moment by Great Britain," and says the point is well summed
up by the London Times in a leading article: "To entitle a
belligerent to treat goods as contraband, there must be a fair
presumption that they are intended for warlike use, and such
presumption does not arise from the mere fact that they are
consigned to a belligerent port. In other words, non-blockaded
ports should be open to the legitimate trade of neutrals and
belligerents who . . . have not the power to establish
an effective blockade cannot be suffered to attain the object of
such a blockade by an extension of the definition of
contraband."
At least since the declaration of Paris of 1856, a paper
blockade is of no legal force, and a blockade to be recognized
by the law of nations must be "maintained by a force sufficient
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." 2 0 This
immensely increased the security of neutral commerce and"
ought not, by the device of declaring an extension of the list of
contraband articles, to be done away at any time by any
belligerent. The Russian declaration which seeks to treat as
contraband substantially all fuel and food, and the staple from
which clothing is made, would certainly have this effect if
enforced, and the most objectionable harrying of neutral com-
merce and deprivation of noncombatant belligerents would be
liable to follow. That this is no small matter to neutral trade
is shown by a very simple consideration of the facts. If we
regard the excessive number of two or even three millions of
persons as engaged in or by location or otherwise infected by
the warlike operations of Japan,2 1 then neutral ships cannot
carry supplies of food or fuel or clothing to those three millions
without liability to seizure, but they may still carry such sup.
ig. Law Times, Aug. 13, 1904, p. 330.
20. Wheaton's Inter. L., 4th Eng. Ed. 19o4, p. 69. See this also declared
in Russian Declaration of Feb. 14, 1904, "Le blocus, pour 6tre obligatoire,
doit 6tre effectif."
21. The entire number of persons in the Army and Navy of Japan, in-
cluding reserve and landwehr, as appears by the Statesman's Year Book of
igo4, page 864, was 667,362.
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plies with entire immunity to some forty-two millions of Japan-
ese, constituting the civil population. The extension by the
terms of the Russian proclamation is of a limitation, lawful as to
one-fifteenth of the people, to the whole people, and it seems an
unwarranted invasion of the plain rights of neutrals to trade in
these great staples with forty-two millions of people.
It is certainly customary for belligerents to announce what
articles they will treat as contraband, and the Institute of Inter-
national Law resolved in 1877 that belligerent governments
should determine this in advance on the occasion of each war, 2 2
and Prince Bismarck so stated in reply to a complaint of Ham-
burg merchants; but no substantial alteration of the rules of
international law can be so made.
If a belligerent, commanding the sea, can thus paralyze the
neutral transport of food, fuel and the staples of clothing, the
suffering and death inflicted on the millions of noncombatants
in such island nations as Great Britain or Japan are appalling
and quite unwarranted by public law, and the blow to neutral
commerce is utterly destructive.
Considering the greatly improved facilities for inland transit,
the test of noxious or not according to the character of the port
of consignment, may require modification, but such articles are,
by the great weight of authority and practice, not, as Russia
would make them, absolutely contraband, but conditionally so,
if intended for warlike use.
So late as December, 1884, Russia, at the Congo Conference,
declared that she would not regard coal as contraband,2 3 and
food stuffs were not in her list of contraband in 1900. 24
His Excellency, Count Cassini, the Ambassador of the Tsar
at Washington, on the i 5 th of September, kindly called my
attention to the fact that: "As to the question of one of the
belligerents declaring absolute contraband goods, not generally
recognized as such, it cannot be regarded as something quite
unusual. During the Franco-Chinese war for instance, the
French government declared rice absolutely contraband without
consideration to its use, which declaration was left unprotested
by any neutral power."
With deference it is submitted that the action of France was
in that case promptly protested by England and that Lord
Granville gave notice that Great Britain would not consider
22. Hal's Inter. L., 5th Ed. 1894, p. 653; Annuaire for 1878, p. 112.
23. Lawrence's War and Neutrality in the Far East, p. 158.
24. Id., p. x66.
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herself bound by a decision of any prize court in support of the
claim of France and no seizure of rice was in fact made. 25
Supplies of American canned meats bound for Port Arthur
and Vladivostock were, at the opening of the war, seized by the
Japanese, but they were plainly contraband as destined for the
use of the enemy's armed force.2 6
As Dr. Lawrence shows, England imports about four-
fifths of the wheat and flour she consumes, and as he says,"The
value of our food trade to other nations secures that we shall
receive powerful assistance in our efforts to keep it open. It
is a matter of life and death for us to prevent any change in
international law which shall make the food of the civilian
population undoubtedly contraband and if arguments and pro-
tests will not do it, force must."
26
The United States is a great exporter of cotton (she pro-
duces about two-thirds of the world's supply) and of food
products. About one-half of her population is directly engaged
in agriculture, or constitutes the households of those who are so
engaged. As a result, no government can maintain itself
in that republic which does not use all possible efforts to keep
open this foreign trade in field products.
Against earnest and concurrent action on the part of these
two powers it would seem strange if Russia should successfully
carry out her plan for extending the definition of contraband,
and so turning back the happy progress of neutral right. In
so far as condemnations have already taken place, they will
undoubtedly be the source of claims for damages which will not
be easily satisfied.
The fact that cotton was declared contraband by the United
States in its war with the Confederacy seems hardly in point, as
cotton was then substantially a government monopoly in the
Confederacy and almost its only source of revenue. 2 7 Cotton
and its seed are the most considerable item in the imports of
Japan, being almost twice as great again in value as sugar, the
second article in value in the list.
The whole record as to claims and rulings as to contraband
is singularly confused and conflicting, but the claim advanced
by Secretary Hay seems so clearly within the practice and the
weight of authority of the past half century that it is hoped it
25. Hall's Inter. L., 19o4, pp. 662-663; Lawrence's War and Neutrality
in the Far East, p. I64; Wheaton's Inter. L., 4th Eng. Ed. 1904, p. 672.
26. Lawrence's War and Neutrality in the FarEast, p. 167.
27. Lawrence's War and Neutrality in the Far East, p. 171
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may prevail. Neutral rights are the rights of the vast majority,
and they should not be lightly prejudiced for those of the bellig-
erents, who are always a small minority. The disturbance to
trade, moreover, caused by a state of belligerency between any
two maritime nations is now world-wide. Steam and electricity
have made us all near neighbors and exactly as the peace and
order of a closely-settled urban community must be kept by far
more stringent regulations than that of a community of scat-
tered shepherds and farmers, just so the peace and security of
the vastly increased and greatly more connected and interwoven
commerce of the modern seas must be preserved by cor-
respondingly adequate rules.
The St. Petersburg dispatches of September 12th seem to
intimate that Russia, upon the advice of the commission of
eminent persons appointed by her to consider this matter, is
inclined to modify her declaration as to absolute and conditional
contraband in substantial accord with the American and British
notes, except as to cotton, and this is confirmed by those of the
x9 th. The action is received with very wide satisfaction, and, it
is believed, is in accord with the peaceful and beneficent senti-
ment of the world. Russia is to be congratulated upon the
wisdom and humanity of this action, and Secretary Hay upon
his successful protest against what he well characterized as "a
declaration of war against commerce of every description be-
tween the people of a neutral and those of a belligerent state."
BELLIGERENT ACT IN A NEUTRAL HARBOR.*
The seizure of a Russian vessel of war by the Japanese in the
Chinese harbor of Chefoo on August i2th, involves most grave
questions of international law. The Russian vessel was pursued
by Japanese destroyers, but escaped from them in the night.
They later found her in the neutral harbor. The Japanese
vessels waited outside the port. The Russian failed to come
out. The Japanese commander, anticipating his escape by night
and a possible attack on merchantmen, entered the port with
two destroyers. It is claimed the Russian had been in port
twenty-seven hours, and was not yet completely disarmed. A
Japanese officer with an armed forced was sent on board in the
night-the hour was three A. M.-with a message that the Jap-
anese expected her to leave by dawn or to surrender. The
* A reply to this discussion was printed by Mr. K. K. Kawakami, attached
to the Imperial Japanese Commission at St. Louis, in the jraanese-American
Commercial Weekly of September 4, 1904.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
Russian commander refused and was overheard directing that
the ship be blown up. At the same time he seized the Japanese
officer and threw him overboard, falling with him; and the
Japanese interpreter was thrown overboard. The forward
magazine exploded, killing and injuring several. The Japanese,
being armed and the Russians disarmed, the former prevailed
in the m~l6e and took possession of the vessel and removed her
from the harbor. The Japanese loss, due to the explosion,
was one killed, four mortally wounded and nine others injured.
Admiral Alexieff informed the Tsar that the vessel was dis-
armed the day before, according to arrangements with the
Chinese officials. The captain and most of her officers and crew
swam ashore and reported that the Japanese fired on them as
they fled. The Russian captain reports that he had disarmed
the ship and, having no arms to resist what he calls a piratical
attack in a neutral harbor, ordered the ship blown up.
Admiral Alexieff says the Russians were conferring with the
Chinese officials as to a temporary stay to repair the ship's
engines, and had given up to the Chinese officials the breech
blocks of the guns and rifles and had lowered the ensign and
pennant. 2 8
Russia earnestly protested at Pekin against this violation of
a Chinese port. Japan retained the vessel and justified the
seizure on several grounds, claiming that the Russian ship was
not effectively disarmed; that her continuance after the lapse
of twenty-four hours in the harbor was itself a violation of the
neutrality of China and so absolved Japan; that the visit was to
ascertain whether or not the ship was in fact disarmed ade-
quately and whether she had just claim to remain for repairs
and to demand her departure otherwise, and that the Russians
began hostilities and thus justified the Japanese in the capture;
that the weakness of China in enforcing her neutrality and the
nearness of the port to the seat of war all excused the trans-
action.
It is respectfully submitted that none of these can be
accepted as justifying the capture without suffering serious im-
pairment of the sanctity, the peace and order of neutral harbors
and encouraging a painful retrogression in the public law
applicable.
As Wheaton says, Bynkershoek alone, of writers of authority,
allows the seizure of a vessel pursued into neutral waters, and
even he admits he has never seen this doctrine in any but the
28. See London Times (Weekly Ed.) Aug. ig, x9o4, p. 532.
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Dutch writers. 2 9 Mr. John Bassett Moore shows that Bynker-
shoek's doctrine as to right of pursuit is almost unanimously
condemned, collecting the authorities upon the subject, 3 0 and
he also shows that in i8o6 President Madison so held in pro-
testing against the destruction of a French ship "L'Impdtueux,"
disabled by a gale and destroyed by the "Melampus" and two
other British ships on the coast of North Carolina. The present
was, moreover, hardly a case of fresh pursuit, the Russian vessel
having eluded her pursuers and having been later found in the
Chinese port.
The practice of powerful belligerents, and especially Eng-
land, was formerly to pay little, if any, attention to the sanctity
of a neutral port, yet the practice seems never to have been
deemed lawful.
Here are some of the old precedents involving hostile meet-
ings of war vessels in neutral waters. During the second Punic
war Scipio, with two Roman galleys, entered the port of Syphax,
King of Numidia, to seek his alliance. There he found
Hasdrubal upon a like errand with seven Carthaginian galleys,
but they "durst not attack him in the King's haven." 81 The
Venetians and Genoese being at war, their fleets met in the
harbor of Tyre, "and would have engaged in the very haven
but were interdicted by the Governor," and therefore went to
sea and fought in the open. 3
2
In 3604, James the First of England forbade acts of bellig-
erency in certain waters near the English coast; but in x6o 5 the
Dutch and Spanish fleets fought in Dover harbor. The English
castle was silent until the victorious Dutch bound their pris-
oners two by two and threw them into the sea; then at last the
castle battery fired upon the inhuman victors. 8 8  England here
tardily resisted a breach of the neutrality of a British port.
However, a year later, the Dutch East India fleet was attacked
by the British in Bergen harbor. The governor of the town
fired upon the attacking fleet. 
3 4
Four French ships of war which fled to Lagos after conflict
with the English off Cadiz, in '759, were destroyed in that
harbor by the English. Portugal made complaint to England.
29. Wheaton's Inter. L., Sec. 429 (4th ed., Eng.).
3o. Moore's Hist. Internat. Arb., i12o.
31. Moore's International Arbitration, p. iii6, quoting the incident from
Livy.
32. Id., p. x117, quoting Molloy "De Jure Maritimo" (sth ed.), p. 12.
33. Walker's Inter. L., p. x69-7o; Grotius' Hist. XIV, p. 794.
34. Vatt. Bk. III, Ch. VII, Sec. 132.
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Pitt was civil and an apology was duly made by the Earl of
Kinoul as special Ambassador Extraordinary, who promised
that the British would be more careful in the future, but there
was no restitution or compensation. 35
Phillimore declares this "a clear and unquestionable viola-
tion of the neutral rights of Portugal, and it was one of the
causes of war by France against Portugal. 86
In 1781 an English squadron in Porto Praya in the Cape
Verde Islands, was attacked by a French fleet. The Portugese
fort resisted the attack and no prizes were taken. The French
government approved the attack, as Ortolan says, perhaps in
retaliation for the action at Lagos. 3 7
The French frigate "Modeste" was captured by the English
in the harbor of Genoa in 1793. There was neither apology
nor restitution. 88
In the war of i8i2, the United States frigate "Essex," at
anchor and dismasted in Valparaiso harbor, was attacked and
captured by two British ships. The "Levant," a prize of the
United States frigate "Constitution," was chased into Porto
Praya and there captured while at anchor by vessels from the
British fleet.3 9
The American privateer "General Armstrong," a brig'of
seven guns, was attacked and destroyed by a British squadron
of one hundred and thirty guns in the harbor of Fayal in 1814.40
The resistance was most gallant and assaults were repeatedly
repulsed with great loss of life. The Portugese governor inter-
posed with the English commander to obtain a cessation of
hostilities, but the latter claimed that the "Armstrong" had
fired upon the English boats without cause and that he would
take possession of the privateer in consequence, saying that if
the Portugese interfered he would treat the castle and island as
enemies. It appeared that at evening the long boats of the
British squadron, with a large force, apparently armed, outnum-
bering the crew of the privateer, approached so as to touch her
stern with a boat hook. They were warned off, and not desist-
ing, were fired on with fatal results, and returned the fire. The
English commander claimed that he intended to reconnoitre the
privateer merely, and to observe the neutrality of the port.
35. Dana's Notes to Wheaton, See. 430; Moore's Inter. Arb., p. 1127.
36. 3 Phillimore's Inter. L., Sec. 373.
37. Moore's Hist. Inter. Arb., p. 1127; Dip. de La Mer, II, 320.
38. Hall's Inter. L. (ed. of 1904), p. 602.
39. Dana's Notes to Wheaton, See. 430.
4o. Wharton's Dig. 6o4; Snow's Cases Inter. L., p. 396.
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The circumstances were such that the Americans thought them-
selves justified in taking the approach as an attack and at-
tempted boarding, and in resisting accordingly. The vessel lay
during most of the affray within a half-pistol shot of the castle.
Some buildings were burned and persons were killed upon the
land by the British cannonade, well illustrating the results of
such a practice.
This was the foundation of a claim against Portugal by the
United States for failing to keep the peace of the port. On a
reference to Louis Napoleon, President of the French Republic,
as arbiter, he finally held, in 1852, a few days before he
assumed the imperial dignity, against the claim, on the ground
that the Americans did not apply for protection to the Portu-
gese authorities in time, and that they fired first upon the
British boats as they approached in the night. This case has
been cited as the principal case supporting the conduct of the
Japanese at Chefoo.
Dana says that the "decision was not satisfactory to the
United States Government, as they did not consider the fact on
which it rested as established in proof." He thinks the rule
should be confined to cases where the vessel "makes a fair choice
to take the chances of a combat rather than to appeal to neutral
protection." 4 1
Lawrence thinks the doctrine of the decision has been fully
accepted by British publicists, while American jurists have been
disposed to deny or qualify. it, but he reaches the conclusion
that the side which in a neutral harbor fights purely in self-
defense can hardly on that account forfeit the right to redress.
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The rule that the belligerent captured in a neutral port
cannot recover compensation from the neutral power, unless he
demanded protection, and there was failure to afford it, is by
no means an indication that the neutral may not demand satis-
faction for the invasion of its sovereignty without any such
circumstances. The basis of recovery is the negligence of the
neutral in one case, but the basis of recovery in the other is the
trespass of the offending belligerent.
Mr. Justice Story, a person quite as extensively versed in
public law as Napoleon the Third, considered that a belligerent
attacked in neutral territory is justified in using force in self-
defense. 4 8
41. Dana's notes to Wheaton, Sec. 430.
42. T. J. Lawrence's Inter. L., p. 546.
43. Hall's Inter. L. (ed. of i9o4), p. 625, and mote citing "The Anne," 3
Wheat. 447. See also T. J. Lawrence Prin. Inter. L., p. 54o.
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It is impossible that international law should be so divorced
from the law of nature and all municipal law as to hold other-
wise, and in the private law of self-defense one may always
justify upon the appearance of necessity.
It is believed that later practice and decisions in no way
warrant the invasion of a neutral port even to seize or attack a
hostile cruiser harboring there. Ortolan long since, while
strongly supporting the exterritoriality of ships of war, yet
declared that if the vessel of war in territorial waters undertakes
to commit any acts of aggression or hostility or violence, it is
the right ot all nations to immediately take all the measures
and employ all the means necessary for a legitimate defense. 44
It is literally defense against a hostile invasion.
The more recent precedents are as follows: Near the opening of
the Franco-Prussian war a French ship, after an unsuccessful
combat with a German ship off the harbor of Havana, escaped
into the harbor. The German vessel respected the neutrality of
the Spanish port and did not further molest the French ship
which remained at Havana until the close of the war. 4 5
The United States warship "Wachusett," in 1864, attacked
and captured the Confederate cruiser "Florida" in the harbor
of Bahia and towed her to sea. In that case, also, there was
resistance, and shots were exchanged and three men were
injured on the attacking vessel. 4 6 She was pursued by a
Brazilian man-of-war, but escaped by superior speed. Although
feeling against vessels of the class of the "Florida" and against
countries harboring them was most intense, yet the act was
repudiated wholly by the United States, the commander of the
Federal vessel was court-martialed, the consul, who had advised
him, dismissed, and the Supreme Court held that Brazil was
justified by the law of nations in demanding the return of the
captured vessel, and proper redress otherwise, and that the cap-
tors acquired no rights. 4 7
In like manner, in the case of the American steamer "Chesa-
peake, which was, it was claimed, piratically seized on a voyage
between New York and Portland in 1863 by certain alleged
Confederate partisans, who took passage on her in New York,
she having been pursued by a warship of the United States into
Nova Scotian waters and there seized, and two men on board
44. Diplomatie de la Mer. 9.218.
45. Harfier's Weekly, Aug. 27, 10o4. P. 1309.
46. Maclay's Hist. of the Navy, Vol. 2, p. 557.
47. "The Florida," ioi U. S. 37; Hall's Inter. L. (ed. x9o4), p. 620.
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and one of the leaders of the partisans, on a neighboring vessel,
taken into custody. The vessel and the men were surrendered
by the United States and an apology made for violating British
territory. 4 
8
Dispatches from Buenos Ayres of August 28, 1904, show
that relations between Argentina and Uruguay have become
strained through an attack by Uruguay on an insurrectionary
force directed against her, but in Argentine waters.
The cases holding the seizures of merchant vessels in neutral
waters void are too numerous to collate and are therefore
omitted.
The fact that the Russian ship had remained more than
twenty-four hours in the Chinese harbor shows a possible viola-
tion of the twenty-four-hour limit adopted by China in her
declaration of neutrality, if the Russian ship was not, as claimed,
detained for necessary repairs and already disarmed.
The limit of twenty-four hours was one which China could
adopt or not in her discretion and therefore could enforce or
not. 4 9 No other power had the right to enter her ports to
enforce it. It is usual, but not a legal obligation, for neutral
nations to fix such a limit for the stay of belligerent ships of
war in their ports. Though such a rule seems in process of
formation as a requirement, yet during the present operations,
though many have, numerous nations appear not to have an-
nounced such a limit.
In the case of a Russian gunboat in the harbor of Shanghai
which failed to withdraw on the demand of China, Dr. Lawrence
says that Japan "'might have given notice to China that she
would no longer respect the territorial waters of a state which
seemed powerless to defend its neutrality, or she might have
claimed reparation for the indulgence shown to her oppon-
ent."8 0  She did neither, but after long parley the Russian
vessel was dismantled. The statement of the rights of Japan
seems extreme, and the constant assumption that the twenty-
four hours limit is a provision of international law which a bellig-
erent may enforce against any neutral seems wholly unwar-
ranted.
A practice of declaring such limit is wide-spread and grow-
ing, but the rule on this subject as stated in the edition of
48. Hall's Inter. L. (ed. 19o4), p. 620; Wheaton's Inter. L. (4th ed. Eng.), p.
580.
49. Dana's notes to Wheaton, Sec. 429.
So. War and Neutral. in the Far East, p. 138.
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Wheaton published within the year with notes by J. Beresford
Atley, is as follows: "The reception or exclusion of bellig-
erent cruisers and their prizes in neutral ports is a matter
entirely at the discretion of the neutral government." 51  He
shows that the limit of twenty-four hours for the stay of a bellig-
erent ship of war in a neutral harbor is not half a century old
and depends on the action of the neutral power in declaring it,
and that it is not a settled obligation of international law.
Lawrence thinks the twenty-four-hour regulation admirable
and points out that neutrals are bound to treat both belligerents
alike, but says the law of nations allows the stay of belligerent
vessels in neutral ports, and that we have no right to complain
where this regulation is not adopted. He says expressly that
the common "assumption that International Law forbids
belligerent vessels to enjoy the shelter of neutral ports for
more than twenty-four hours at a time . . . is an error,
but one so general that those who give expression to it have
much excuse." 5 2
A neutral state may at will close all its ports to belligerents,
and the New York Nation says: "Norway and Sweden, we
believe, have done so in the present war. "5 9 It is believed that
Norway and Sweden and Denmark have excluded war ships of
the two belligerents from a large number of their principal
fortified ports, but not from all. Their proclamations of neu-
trality seem to so provide, and this has been their policy for
half a century. 54  They impose the twenty-four-limit in such
ports as are left open.
The fact that Japan on September inth made protest against
the Russian auxiliary cruiser "Lena" remaining in San Fran-
cisco harbor longer than twenty-four hours brings home the
question to the United States Government. The vessel claimed
that she was detained for necessary repairs and the United
States took steps to ascertain whether or not this was well
founded, and enforced very fully its neutral regulations by
directing the disarmament of the ship. It is inconceivable that
any foreign power could undertake to investigate by force such
a question and to determine for itself the facts and thereupon
precipitate a naval engagement in San Francisco harbor. It is
not conceivable that such a practice could be tolerated by the
51. Wheaton's Inter. L. (4th Eng. ed.), p. 587, note.
52. War and Neutral. in Far East, 120.
53. The Nation, Aug. 4, 1904, p. Or.
54. Rev. Gen. de Droit, Pub. Mai-Juin, 1904, pp. 14 and 15 of Documents.
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neutral maritime powers. The claim of the Japanese Consul
of a right to personally inspect the "Lena" was not admitted
by the collector of the port, who held, very justly, that such
inspection was the business of the United States authorities
alone. 56 A belligerent cannot have the right to police all
neutral harbors for the purpose of enforcing regulations imposed
by those powers. Any such invasion of territorial jurisdiction
upon a disputed question of fact would be lamentable in its
results and any rule naturally leading to such consequences
should be resisted absolutely on its first appearance.
The Nation asks in this connection, why all neutral ports
should not be closed except to ships in distress. It may be
observed that a neutral state does habitually close its landed
territory to the forces of a belligerent, and that a like rule applied
habitually to neutral ports would greatly limit naval warfare
and tend to check the loss and disturbance which it inflicts on
neutral commerce. It would strongly tend to localize war and
avoid far-reaching complications. The main objection to it, as
has been said, is the overwhelming advantage it would give to
great colonial powers like Great Britain, having ports in all
parts of the world.
Peace being the normal order of things, as Sir John Mac-
donell has lately said, the disposition of the past forty years has
been that the "interest of neutrals should prevail in conflict
with those of belligerents," 5 6 and the recrudescence of bellig-
erent sentiment which Sir John reports, must be abated. Com-
merce, after all, is the great interest and service of the seas,
and war is a minor and temporary affair. The greater interest
ought not to yield to the less, except under the most direct
necessity.
SINKING NEUTRAL VESSELS.
The sinking of a neutral ship by a Russian squadron on the
ground that she was carrying contraband of war and that it was
impossible on account of the weather, lack of coal and the neigh-
borhood of a Japanese fleet, to bring her in for adjudication, has
led to wide and unfavorable criticism.
The ship, the "Knight Commander," was alleged to be
loaded with a cargo of railroad supplies, intended for belligerent
use by Japan. Her papers were preserved, her officers and
crew placed in safety and allowed to attend the condemnation
55. New York Nation, Sept. 15, 1904.
56. Nineteenth Century, July, 19o4..
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proceedings at Vladivostock. The court there subsequently
held such proceedings a basis for condemnation.
The criticism seems to rest on the doctrine often asserted
that although a belligerent vessel taken as a prize may be
destroyed if it cannot be brought in, yet a neutral vessel so
taken must not be destroyed, but if she cannot be brought in,
must be allowed to go free, even though carrying contraband.
The contraband articles cannot be taken from the neutral ship
for at least two reasons: First, commonly, as in the case of
the "Knight Commander's" cargo of railroad supplies, it is
physically impossible for the war ships to accommodate them.
Secondly, the claim always is, that the ship and her papers and
necessary witnesses must be brought into port as a condition
for condemning the cargo. Thus, in the Trent affair, where it
was claimed that the carrying of Messrs. Mason and Slidell
was in the nature of carrying contraband, and that therefore
their seizure and removal was warranted, it was successfully
answered that until coirdemned by a proper prize court, a captor
has no right to do anything except bring the ship before the
court. 
5 7
This doctrine, that a neutral vessel can never be destroyed
before adjudication, seems to rest mainly on the case of the
"Felicity,"5S where Sir W. Scott passed on the subject of an
American merchant ship and cargo destroyed by the English
cruiser "Endymion" during the war of x812. The vessel was
sailing under British license but mistook her captor for an
American warship. She therefore concealed this license. The
weather was so boisterous and the vessel so injured that she
could not be brought to port, nor could the captor spare a prize
crew. She was therefore burned. The court holds, as her
license was concealed, she must be treated simply as a bellig-
erent, and that the destruction was legal. It is said, arguendo
merely, that if she had shown her license she would have been
entitled to be treated as a neutral, and Sir William says:
"Where it is neutral the act of destruction cannot be justi-
fied to the neutral owner by the gravest importance of such an
act to the public service of the captor's own state; to the
neutral it can only be justified, under any such circumstances,
by a full restitution in value. These are rules so clear in
principle and established in practice that they require neither
reason nor precedent to illustrate or support them."
57. Wheaton's Inter. L. (Ed. x9o4) Sec. iogb.
58. Dodson's Admiralty, 381.
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This remark of an eminent judge seems largely the parent of
the rule. It is submitted, with deference, that the rule apparently
sought to be enforced by the Russian authorities and recognized
by the Vladivostock court, is more just and reasonable-namely,
that if, for good and sufficient cause, such neutral prize cannot
be brought in, there is no obligation to allow her to go free, to
reinforce the enemy with her cargo, but as a rule of necessity, to
prevent the delivery of the cargo, she may be destroyed exactly
as a belligerent, the crew and papers being preserved and the
question of prize or no prize being adjudicated as if she had
been brought in. It seems too much to expect the other rule
to be observed where the cargo is plainly contraband and impor-
tant to the enemy. The objection by England to the destruc-
tion of this ship, M. de la Peyre declared recently, does not rest
on a solid foundation, and that of the United States, he says, is
even less permissible since during the war of secession the two
parties systematically sank all the prizes.
M. de la Peyre is under a mistake. The Federal cruisers
habitually brought in and submitted to the prize courts their
captures. No such course was open to the Confederate cruisers,
since all the ports of the Confederacy were blockaded and the
ports of no other country were open to them for such use.
Captain Semmes of the Confederate cruiser "Alabama"
habitually burned his captures, 5 9 but he seized only vessels
belonging to American citizens and carefully avoided neutral
ships or cargoes. His practice is therefore no precedent as to
the right to destroy a neutral vessel without condemnation.
His situation was, however, such that if he had the full
rights of a belligerent it would seem that he had as a matter of
necessity the right to destroy contraband of war even without
the intervention of a prize court. Suppose an armed British
ship, fitted for belligerent use. had been met on her way to a
Federal port, evidently designed for sale and likely to be bought
by the Federal Government. Would Captain Semmes have
been bound by international law to leave her unmolested since
he could not bring her into port for condemnation? The sug-
gestion that such is the law because of Sir William Scott's dictum
and the echo of it by the writers, cannot be concurred in.
It must be admitted that a neutral, carrying contraband, is
not exposed by that act alone to condemnation of the ship, but
Sir William Scott himself recognized that "the ancient prac-
59. Offic. Records U. S. & Confed. Navies, Vol. x, where conduct of both
navies is set out at length and in detail, with records and correspondence.
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tice was otherwise," and said, "it cannot be denied that it was
perfectly defensible on every principle of justice." 6 0 He shows
that modern policy has introduced a relaxation on this point,
but that circumstances of aggravation or misconduct may
revive against the ship the ancient penalty.
Justice Story shows that the penalty is applied to the vessel
on account of codperation "in a meditated fraud upon the
belligerents by covering up the voyage under falge papers and
with a false destination. ''6 1  The whole right of seizure and
condemnation of neutral contraband is based, as Kent shows
from Vatel, on "the law of necessity" and "the principle of
self-defense." 
6 2
Sir W. Scott held that the penalty for carrying dispatches
of a belligerent (certainly a more noxious act), must be the
condemnation of the neutral ship, and argues that the confisca-
tion of the dispatches would be ridiculous and says: "It
becomes absolutely necessary, as well as just, to resort to some
other measure of confiscation, which can be no other than that
of the vehicle." 6 8 If the courts of Russia, reasoning as boldly
as Sir William, Mr. Justice Story and Chancellor Kent, are
allowed to maintain their conclusion from the rules of justice
and necessity, their position is by no means untenable.
His Excellency, Count Cassini, the Russian Imperial Am-
bassador to the United States, on the i 5 th of September, 1904,
by letter, kindly called the writer's attention to the Russian
Imperial Order of March 27, 1895, which reads as follows:
"In extreme cases, where the retention of ships is impossible,
owing to their bad condition, when they are of small value, in
danger of capture by the enemy, when at a great distance from
a home port, or when there is danger for the ship which has
taken the prize, the commander, upon his responsibility, may
burn. or sink the captured vessel after previously having taken
her crew and, as far as possible, her cargo. Her documents
must be preserved and witnesses can be held for the purpose of
testimony before the prize court."
His Excellency adds:
"As this last declaration has nevcr been protested by any
power, it appears, consequently, that the commander of the
Russian man-of-war committed a perfectly lawful act in sinking
60. The ,Neutralitet," 3, C. Robinson 295.
61. Carrington v. Merchts. Ins. Co., 8, Peters 495.
62. Seton v. Low, x Johns. Cases i.
63. The "Atlanta," 6, C. Robinson 440.
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the British steamer 'Knight Commander,' which was undoubt-
edly carrying contraband of war, as it was proven immediately
after her being stopped. This was confirmed later on the trial,
when the deposition of the captain was refuted and contradicted
by the presented board documents which he supposed to be
lost with the ship."
The instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy of the
United States in 3898 to blockading vessels and cruisers, and
prepared by the Department of State, strongly resemble those
of Russia.
They are as follows:
"28. If there are controlling reasons why vessels may not be
sent in for adjudication, as unseaworthiness, the existence of
infectious disease or the lack of a prize crew, they may be
appraised and sold, and if this cannot be done they may be
destroyed. The imminent danger of recapture would justify
destruction, if there was no doubt that the vessel was good-
prize. But, in all such cases, all the papers and other testi-
mony should be sent to the prize court, in order that a decree
may be duly entered."
It is to be observed that the language is general, applicable
to neutral as well as belligerent vessels, and it is believed it
in a measure supports the Russian contention.
It is submitted that this rule and the Russian practice are
entirely reasonable and in accordance with the necessities of
maritime war and that they are, therefore, able to impair the
authority of a dictum even from so eminent an admiralty judge
as Sir W. Scott.
The result of this inadequate discussion of these several
problems in international law (a few of the many lately mooted)
is a humiliating sense of the uncertainty, confusion and conflict
which still attend the maritime rights of neutrals in the time of
war. One is forced almost to acquiesce in M. de La Peyre's
recent statement, that maritime international law does not
exist. 6 4
It certainly shows the great necessity of an authoritative inter-
national conference to discuss, define and establish the rights
and duties of neutral commerce in time of war. Now that the
vast and complicated machinery of war is of such desolating
destruction, it is more true even than a generation ago, when
the late Mr. Lecky so convincingly proclaimed it, that the rich
nations are the potent ones in war, as in a ruder age they were
not. It is true, too, that the very riches which enable them to
64. Ouest. Diplomatiques et Coloniales, Aug. 1, 1904, p. 185.
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support, powerfully persuade them to avoid, war. These great
commercial powers possess the seas with their beneficent
adventures and they must strive to keep the peace on those
great highways of all the nations, and the ships that bear the
means of life must be considered as of interest and human claim
equal and paramount to those designed to inflict death.
Charles Noble Gregory.
Dean's Ofle, College of Law, State University of Iowa.
